The state court appointed Receiver of the Debtor (Receiver) and his Counsel filed separate motions seeking allowance of compensation and expenses incurred as administrative expense claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 543(c)(2), 503(b)(3)(E) and 503(b)(4). The Receiver served in this capacity for the ten-day pre-petition period and was superseded by the commencement of the bankruptcy case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 543(a). The Receiver did not seek authority to continue in this capacity for the post-petition period yet continued to play an active role in the case primarily by seeking its dismissal. The Receiver and Counsel sought compensation and expenses for both the pre and post-petition periods. The Receiver and Counsel argued that it was not necessary that their actions contributed a substantial benefit to the estate for an award of fees but instead that the Court should rule in their favor because their activities could reasonably have been thought to be beneficial to the estate when they were performed. The Court, in concluding pursuant to well established law that a genuine benefit to the estate must be established, found that: (1) conclusory and bald averments that the Receiver and Counsel’s work tended toward the preservation and benefit of the estate was not sufficient; (2) reduced compensation for the Receiver would be awarded only for the ten-day pre-petition period; (3) Counsel was not entitled to any compensation, as his time records did not provide any evidence that his work tended toward the preservation or benefit of the estate.

Debtor/Defendant moved to dismiss nondischargeability adversary proceeding for untimeliness under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c), specifically asserting that following conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 there is no Section 341(a) meeting of creditors and that therefore Plaintiff's complaint under Section 523(a)(2) had to be filed no later than sixty (60) days following the date of conversion to be timely, despite Rule 4007(c)'s explicit command that the deadline expires sixty (60) days after the "first date set for the meeting of creditors under Section 341(a)".
The Court held that, upon conversion, Section 348(a) operates to spawn a new "order for relief" (notwithstanding the statutory caveat that the "date of" the order for relief does not change from the date of the original order for relief) and that this in turn generates a second, independent Section 341(a) meeting of creditors, by operation of the plain meaning of Sections 301, 341(a), 342(a), 343 and 348(a).

These provisions, taken in conjunction with Rule 1019(2), which mandates the resetting of Rule 4007(c)'s deadline
following conversion from a case under Chapter 11 to a case under Chapter 7, require that a Section 341(a) meeting be convened post-conversion and that nondischargeability complaints must be filed within the time period stated in Rule 4007(c)'s plain language i.e. within sixty (60) days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors in the converted case. As the Plaintiff's complaint was timely filed, Debtor's motion to dismiss was denied.

Counsel for Debtor filed an amended application for compensation, in which Counsel reduced the amount of compensation sought by approximately $7,000 from the original application for compensation. The voluntary reduction was not explained by Counsel. Hence, the Court concluded that it arose from an error in calculation and was not an exercise of either billing judgment or Counsel's largesse. Because the section of the amended application devoted to "billing judgment" did not provide a sufficient analysis of why a voluntary reduction of actual fees would be inappropriate in this instance, but instead recited factors common to any Chapter 11 case, the Court, finding that the exercise of "billing judgment" is a requirement of all attorney fee applications, further reduced Counsel's fees by $745.

Debtor/Defendant moved to dismiss nondischargeability adversary proceeding for untimeliness under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c), specifically asserting that following conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 there is no Section 341(a) meeting of creditors and that therefore Plaintiff's complaint under Section 523(a)(2) had to be filed no later than sixty (60) days following the date of conversion to be timely, despite Rule 4007(c)'s explicit command that the deadline expires sixty (60) days after the "first date set for the meeting of creditors under Section 341(a)".
The Court held that, upon conversion, Section 348(a) operates to spawn a new "order for relief" (notwithstanding the statutory caveat that the "date of" the order for relief does not change from the date of the original order for relief) and that this in turn generates a second, independent Section 341(a) meeting of creditors, by operation of the plain meaning of Sections 301, 341(a), 342(a), 343 and 348(a).

These provisions, taken in conjunction with Rule 1019(2), which mandates the resetting of Rule 4007(c)'s deadline
following conversion from a case under Chapter 11 to a case under Chapter 7, require that a Section 341(a) meeting be convened post-conversion and that nondischargeability complaints must be filed within the time period stated in Rule 4007(c)'s plain language i.e. within sixty (60) days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors in the converted case. As the Plaintiff's complaint was timely filed, Debtor's motion to dismiss was denied.

Debtor filed a motion to redeem his automobile, secured by a lien in favor of Respondent, pursuant to Sections 722 and 506(a) by paying the value of the collateral in a lump sum within 30 days. The Court concluded that in order to redeem the automobile, Debtor must pay the fair-market, retail value of the collateral, as adjusted for age and condition. The Court further held that under Section 506(a)(2), added by BAPCPA, the valuation of the collateral should be made as of the date of filing of the petition, and thus post-petition depreciation should not be taken into account.

Debtor, who had a Chapter 13 case dismissed within the preceding 1-year period, filed a motion to extend the automatic stay in her current Chapter 13 case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 362(c)(3)(B) after the expiration of the 30-day post-petition period. The Court conducted an initial hearing and Debtor subsequently filed a motion for declaratory judgment as to the extent of the termination of the stay under Section 362(c)(3)(A) and additionally sought the imposition of a stay under Section 105(a). A secured creditor, holder of a deed of trust on Debtor’s residence, objected to both motions, arguing, in an attempt to proceed with foreclosure, that the automatic stay under Section 362(a) had expired in toto by operation of law. The Bankruptcy Court, J. Gordon, held that: (1) the automatic stay terminated by operation of law on the 30th day post-petition under Section 362(c)(3)(A), (2) an untimely filed motion cannot serve to reimpose the automatic stay under Section 362(c)(3)(B), (3) the termination of the stay under Section 362(c)(3)(A) was limited in scope and the stay, while terminating as to the Debtor, did not terminate as to property of the estate, and (4) the alternative relief requested by Debtor under Section 105(a) appeared unnecessary in light of the Court’s ruling.

Debtor, an experienced mortgage broker and real estate professional who engineered and caused the establishment of a conservation easement and environmental mitigation credit bank as to certain valuable real estate which he owned, acted with the requisite fraudulent intent under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) when he conveyed and transfered the same real estate in fee simple to good faith purchasers for value but continued to sell those mitigation credits to third parties, such that the resulting judgment entered by the state court should be excepted from his discharge. Fraudulent intent, for purposes of Section 523(a)(2)(A), requires that the debtor subjectively intended to deceive the creditor, based on the totality of the circumstances. Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances, including when the debtor knowingly or recklessly made false representations. In this case, Debtor argued that he was simply and innocently mistaken as to his right to continue selling the credits after conveying the underlying real property and that he did not intend to defraud the Plaintiffs. The Court found the existence of fraudulent intent based on a confluence of factors: 1) Debtor misrepresented to Plaintiffs at closing that all of the credits had been sold and at no time disclosed his intention to continue selling the credits post-settlement, 2) no documents either severed the interest in the credits from the interest in the land or disclosed the existence of the credits, 3) no documents supported Debtor's argument that he honestly believed he retained the right to continue to sell the credits, despite the fact that Debtor engineered the creation of the property rights at issue, 4) any ongoing maintenance duties as to the conservation easement, if Debtor had any, did not entitle Debtor to exercise control over the credits, and 5) Debtor sold the credits in at least 15 separate transactions post-settlement utilizing a form contract that erroneously continued to identify his wholly-owned entity as the owner of the real estate.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(2)(A) for a mortgage debt incurred by Debtors years before, asserting that Debtors misrepresented their ownership of the real property that secured the loan. The results of Plaintiff's pre-filing investigation established Debtors did in fact own the real property at the time the debt was incurred. Debtors' filed a motion to dismiss and Plaintiff responded with its own motion to dismiss the Adversary Proceeding. After Debtors received their discharge, they filed a motion for award of attorney's fees under Section 523(d), contending that Plaintiff’s position in bringing the Adversary Proceeding was not substantially justified. Finding that Plaintiff knew or should have known the complaint lacked substantial justification before it was filed and that despite Plaintiff’s subsequent dismissal, the case therefore should never have been filed, the Court granted summary judgment for Debtors and awarded attorney’s fees.

Condominium association moved for relief from the stay to enforce its lien rights as to Debtor's real estate due to Debtor's failure to pay post-petition assessments. Movant and Debtor, pro se, submitted a proposed consent order that the Court found lacking in several respects. In this Order Denying Consent Order Modifying Stay Without Prejudice, the Court articulates its general requirements for consent orders, including (1) that the debtor is given an opportunity to cure a subsequent default thereunder and (2) that the movant cannot proceed to collect from other property of the estate, such as by obtaining a lien against any other real or personal property or garnishing Debtor’s wages, without first obtaining further authorization from this Court.

Counsel for Debtor filed his first fee application five years into the case seeking approval of compensation of approximately $80,000. In the fee application, Counsel disclosed for the first time that, three years prior, he had received approximately $40,000 directly from a third party non-debtor business entity in which the Debtor held an ownership interest. This compensation arrangement was not outlined in the disclosure of compensation filed with the petition and at no time thereafter did Counsel submit an amended disclosure pursuant to Section 329 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(b). In response to the Court's concerns, Counsel argued that approval of the undisclosed payments was not required because the funds were not property of the estate. Counsel also argued that the exercise of billing judgment is generally not mandatory and was not warranted in this case save for a de minimis write-off. The Court held that 1) income derived by the Debtor from his passive ownership interest in business entities was in the nature of dividends or profits and not wages for post-petition services rendered, was not excepted from property of the estate under Section 541(a)(6), and should not have been used to pay Counsel without court approval, 2) fee applicants must conduct a searching and thorough analysis to determine whether the exercise of billing judgment is necessary, 3) the exercise of billing judgment was required in this case because certain services were of marginal value or were necessitated by Counsel's own failure to meet deadlines, 4) Section 329 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(b) provide an inflexible rule requiring counsel to disclose the precise nature of the fee arrangement with the debtor and the source of compensation to be paid, regardless of whether counsel will seek approval of compensation from the estate, 5) Severe sanctions are rightly imposed for violating the duty to disclose and may require denial of all fees, and 6) Counsel did violate his duty by not disclosing the payment of $40,000 until three years after he received the funds, but since the confirmed plan provided for the payment of all claims in full and there was no apparent harm to the estate, the appropriate sanction in this instance was reduction of compensation by $10,000.